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Stewart, has at least some pages that are well done. Mr. Lethaby's Early Christian Art is little more than a collection of data. All in the best class are Miss Gardner's Religious Disunion in the Fifth Century—setting out well the main lines of controversy and its fruits for the Empire; Dom E. C. Butler's Monasticism—tracing lucidly and sympathetically the growth of monasticism and its main forms through the establishment of the Benedictine rule; and Professor Vinogradoff's Social and Economic Conditions in the Roman Empire—a little technical and heavy on the formation of the colonate, but a thoughtful and helpful general view.

Thus fully half of this volume may well challenge the interest of serious readers upon the early Middle Ages. Doubtless many of us could wish the work were of a different sort, but there is ample reason for gratefully accepting it as it is.

E. W. Dow.

Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land. Lectures delivered at U. S. War College, Newport, R. I., between the years 1887 and 1911, by Captain A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1911. Pp. xxii, 475.)

BELIEVING that in the study of history would be found ample illustration of the principles of sound naval strategy, Captain Mahan first wrote a series of lectures which were afterwards published under the title of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. It was upon this foundation that he then built up the formulation of principles of naval strategy contained in the original lectures which are here presented in their revised and expanded form.

He says that experience is history in the making but experience is quickly forgotten unless recorded. History on the other hand is experience recorded and so these lectures are simply the announcement of principles and illustrations drawn from history in their support.

Four chapters are devoted to Historical Illustrations and Comments on the importance and value of (1) concentration, whether it be of a force on land or on the sea; and, as a means thereto, (2) of a central line or position, (3) of interior lines of movement which such a position presents, and (4) of the bearing of communications upon military tenure and success. These are followed by chapters on the Foundations and Principles of strategy and the application of these principles to the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

The whole volume is practically devoted to an exposition of the great principle of concentration and there are but few pages in the book that do not bring forward some illustration drawn from history that has a bearing on this principle.

Concentration, however, is not necessarily a literal collection of the entire force. "The essential underlying idea is that of mutual support", and, he says, "This consideration, in my judgment, absolutely forbids the division of the present fleet of the United States between the two principal coasts". The halves would then be beyond supporting distance. Russia divided its fleet in the late war, between Port Arthur and the Baltic, which permitted Japan, whose fleet was inferior to Russia's whole, to defeat it in detail.

In discussing the protection afforded by a concentrated superior fleet he states that, "So long as the British fleet can maintain and assert superiority in the North Sea and around the British Islands, the entire Imperial system stands secure." This does not mean that an inferior navy may not by successful evasion and subsequent surprise seize positions in distant parts of the world, as the French did when in 1756 they captured Minorca. "The impulse to try to protect every point can only be overcome by sound principles." At the time of our hostilities with Spain, the Navy Department was besieged with applications for local protection. The detention of the Flying Squadron on the North Atlantic coast which could have been better employed in blockade and dispatch duty may be considered a concession to this alarm—but he says, "In a military sense, as affecting ultimate national safety and victory, it will not matter if one coast suffer raid, blockade, bombardment, or capture, if meanwhile the enemy's fleet be destroyed—with such destruction every other loss is retrievable, *provided* the country, which is not willing to make military preparation beforehand, proves willing to endure the burden of such exertions as may be necessary to reduce to submission an invader whose communications and retreat are both cut off."

Regarding the influence of political questions on naval strategy, while he says they "are primarily the concern of statesmen" he also declares that they are also among the data which the strategist, naval as well as land, has to consider, because they are among the elements which determine the constitution and size of the fleet and the selection of naval bases.

There is one terse sentence that he gives that is illustrative of concentration of effort, and deserves more than anything else to be remembered by every man and officer. "A fleet is half beaten when it goes into battle with one eye upon something else than fighting."

Portolan Charts: their Origin and Characteristics, with a Descriptive List of those belonging to the Hispanic Society of America. By EDWARD LUTHER STEVENSON, Ph.D. (New York: The Hispanic Society. 1911. Pp. vii, 76.)

THE monograph by Professor Stevenson describes thirty-two portolan charts and atlases in the collection of the Hispanic Society of America,